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Abstract
Using a Markov-switching GARCH model this paper analyzes the volatility
evolution of the greenback's price in gold from after the Civil War until the
return to gold convertibility in 1879. The econometric inference associated
with our methodology indicates a switch to a regime of low volatility roughly
seven months before the actual resumption. Since this empirical nding is
most likely to be reconciled with a change in market expectations, we conclude
that expectations aected the exchange rate more than fundamentals. Our
analysis also demonstrates that regime switches in the volatility of exchange
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11 Introduction
The Civil War was not only a decisive moment in American history but also a fun-
damental turning point in nancial development. The return to the gold standard
constituted an important signal to nancial markets worldwide since this monetary
regime was appreciated by almost all major countries until World War I and ul-
timately let the US dollar inherit the role of the leading world currency from the
British pound. However, within the U.S. bullionists and in
ationists fought a erce
political battle over the expected distributional consequences of either monetary
regime.
In this paper we study the period between the end of the American Civil War
and the return to gold in 1879 and contribute to the theoretical debate on the
factors that may drive exchange rates. In the literature covering this debate two
opposing opinions predominate. On the one hand, monetarists like Friedman and
Schwartz (1963) argue that exogenous macroeconomic fundamentals like money sup-
plies, price in
ation and price parities cause the high premiums on gold. This view
is supported, inter alia, by Kindahl (1961), and Ocer (1981). On the other hand,
Calomiris (1992, 1988, 1985) strongly opposes this view by stating that expectations
are more important to the greenback exchange rate than the classical fundamen-
tals (like money supplies). Consequently, Calomiris supports the research pursued,
among others, by Mitchell (1903) and Willard, Guinnane, and Rosen (1996) who
attempt to incorporate news and signicant events in their study of the greenback
markets. However, besides these opposing views other authors (e.g. Smith and
Smith, 1997) argue that both expectations and macroeconomic fundamentals did
play a role in the evolution of the greenback exchange rate.
In this paper we make contributions to both the nancial history of the U.S. and
to the debate on the factors that drive exchange rates. To this end we implement a
so-called Markov-switching GARCH model that has recently emerged in the macro-
nance literature (see for example Wil
ing, 2009) and which enables us to analyze
1time-varying conditional variances of daily greenback-gold exchange rates.
More explicitly our methodology helps us to identify distinct phases (regimes)
of high and low exchange-rate volatility. Since such distinct exchange-rate volatility
regimes can easily be reconciled with market participants' expectations on future
changes in the exchange rate (rather than with changes in fundamentals), we inter-
pret our results as empirical evidence that agents had anticipated the exchange-rate
xing associated with the return to the gold standard beforehand. In particular,
our econometric analysis detects a regime switch from high to low exchange-rate
volatility several months before the actual resumption thus supporting Calomiris'
view that expectations may have mattered more than macroeconomic fundamentals.
Our econometric technique also provides a new means of gauging the Civil War
and the postbellum period. Initially, from a nancial investor's perspective, our
results re
ect the considerable political uncertainty that characterized the postbel-
lum years. However, the switch to a low volatility regime long before the actual
resumption date demonstrates that policy makers were surprisingly able to commit
to their announced resumption plan.
This paper contains 6 sections. In Section 2 we brie
y review the histori-
cal background for which we rely on some of the established historical literature
(e.g. Mitchell, 1903; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Unger, 1964) . Section 3 presents
our data set. In Section 4 we specify our econometric model in the form of a two-
regime Markov-switching GARCH model. Section 5 presents the estimation results
while Section 6 oers some concluding remarks.
2 Historical Background
Before the Civil War the U.S. money supply consisted of gold and silver coins,
copper pennies and notes issued by state or private banks. All non-specie money
could principally be converted into gold. There was no paper money issued by the
government. However, the U.S. was practically on a gold standard since the relative
2price of gold to silver was higher than the world-market price so that not many silver
coins were in circulation. Unlike today, there was no strong banking and currency
system and no Federal Banking System in the U.S. More than 1,600 state banks
existed all over the country and more than 7,000 dierent kinds of bank notes were
in circulation the half of which carried no real worth.
At the beginning of the Civil War the Unionist government encountered dicul-
ties in selling sucient bonds to nance its war eorts, which lead to the suspension
of specie payment by private banks and the government on December 30, 1861. This
was partly due to the increased war expenditures and the low condence in public
securities and to some extent to the lack of condence in the government and the
prospects of the war. These were gravely tampered by the danger of a war with the
United Kingdom because of the Trent aair (an incident in which two Confederate
envoys were captured from the British Mail steamer Trent). The government reacted
by issuing an inconvertible currency which became rapidly known as the `greenback'
to cover war expenditures. Three Legal Tender Acts in February 1862, July 1862,
and in January 1863 put around $450 million greenbacks into circulation.
However, since transactions with foreigners and the payment of customs duties
and taris required gold, greenbacks did not constitute a perfect substitute for gold
dollars. Consequently, a market emerged soon after the greenback issuance and the
greenbacks depreciated from par, the main reasons for the depreciation being the
increased demand induced by the government's war spending, the expansionist scal
policy, negative trade balances and also war news. Bad news induced hoarding in
an expectation of a higher gold price while good news prompted people to sell gold
in anticipation of declining prices. Nevertheless, contemporaries believed this to be
a temporary measure and the parity to be restored after the war, although nothing
had been specically declared. Meanwhile, greenbacks served as legal tender in most
parts of the country where prices were quoted in greenbacks and gold was valued
at its current premium market price. Only at the West Coast prices were quoted in
3gold and discounted to greenback prices at the current market value.
The time after the Civil War saw a huge decline in commodity prices which may
be ascribed to the contraction eorts undertaken by the Secretary of the Treasury,
Hugh McCulloch. These eorts were armed by the Congress in December 1865,
but later restricted by the Congress in April 1866 and nally completely ceased in
1868. In addition, `natural growth' reduced price levels as the money stock was held
fairly stable.
Three legal decisions in 1868 reduced the role of greenbacks in business trans-
actions. (1) In Lane Country vs. Oregon it was ruled that state taxes could only
be paid in specie, but not in legal tender notes. (2) In Bronson vs. Rhodes the
Supreme Court decided that contracts demanding payment only in specie were le-
gal. (3) In Bank of New York vs. Board of Supervisors the state was denied to levy
property taxes on state notes which meant that the court did not consider them
as money. The decision about the legal status of greenbacks was engaged by the
Supreme Court in 1869. Initially it was ruled under Chief Justice Chase (who him-
self at that time had issued the Legal Tender Acts) that greenbacks had no legal
tender status for contracts before the Legal Tender Acts. Owing to the accession
of two new members to the court, this decision was reversed in 1871 when it was
ruled that the government had the right to issue legal tender notes. However, the
issue was not settled before 1884 when it was ruled that the government was eligible
to do so also in times of peace. The government's commitment to debt payment in
coin was shown when President Grant came to power and the gold-payment bill was
enacted { which obliged the government to pay its debt in specie.
In the fall of 1873, the railroad boom suddenly came to an end and the subsequent
banking panic marked the beginning of a crisis in most parts of the country. For the
rest of the decade the currency problem and the conduct of nancial policy became
the issues of major public and political concern. President Grant was cautious
in following either expansionary or contractionary monetary stances, an attitude
4that deeply confused the public opinion. Mixon (2006), for example, reports that
the business community characterized the situation as `frustrating, uncertain, and
unclear, and the nger of blame is clearly pointed at the government.'
After a period of controversial debate the In
ation Bill nally emerged in 1874.
The bill was to provide for additional national bank note circulation and to return
to the $400 million of greenbacks which had circulated before the contraction mea-
sures in the 1860s. It was intended to resume specie payment on January 1, 1876.
Although a rather modest measure, it represented a retreat from the resumption
policy and therefore conservatives appealed to Grant to veto the law. On April 22
Grant gave his veto to the bill which for the public opinion came like a `bombshell.'
In the aftermath, the Republican Party fell into a state of great disunity and for
the rst time since 1861 the Party lost the majority in Congress. Therefore, the
Republicans were eager to restore their unity and enacted the Resumption Act dur-
ing the lame-duck session after the congressional elections in 1874. Fearing another
presidential veto and the upcoming presidential elections, the Republican Senatorial
caucus tried to realign in
ationists and conservatives on a compromise that both
sides could accept. In the wake of this free banking was introduced as a major
concession to the soft money faction and in
ationists since it allowed controlled in-

ation and a promotion of the national banking system. In addition to this, $80
of greenbacks were to be redeemed in exchange for each $100 bank note until only
$300 million were supposed to be left. Resumption was proposed for January 1,
1879. Compared to the vetoed In
ation Bill the proposal itself did not constitute a
real innovation, but the resumption was put exactly three years later on January 1,
1879 and many observers did not assess this decision as nal.
Although the Presidential Election in 1876 loomed dark over the country and the
Republican Party, it was nally decided by aspects like railroad issues and patronage.
After Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican candidate, had won by a margin of one
electoral vote the White House was commanded by a Republican, the House of
5Representatives by the Democrats, while the Senate was in a stalemate. Hayes, a
well-known sound-money representative, appointed John Sherman as Secretary of
the Treasury. Sherman, from then on in charge of the accomplishment of resumption,
believed that he needed at least an amount of gold large enough to be able to redeem
40 per cent of the outstanding greenbacks. This appeared to be a dicult task since
at the same time Germany and France were in dire need of gold themselves. He
proved to be up to the task by oering bonds with higher interest rates to foreigners
and prevented a critical drain on the money market by increasing deposits in national
banks. An attempt to repeal the Resumption Act passed the Congress, but was
declined in the Senate by one vote. The Bland Allison Acts of 1877 and 1878 and
the Coinage Act in May 1878 constituted the nal attempts to avert resumption,
but did not endanger the resumption policy or change the legal commitment to
resume specie payment on January 1, 1879. The crop failures in Europe injected
large amounts of gold into the U.S. and activated the U.S. trade balance from 1876
onwards. Sherman secured this in
ow of gold by selling gold bonds and by November
1878 he had built up a gold reserve of around $141.9 million. The premium on gold
fell constantly and on December 17, 1878 par had been reached for the rst time
since 1862. In the days after resumption only a few notes were redeemed and in fact
more gold was exchanged for paper money. Although this might be considered as a
victory of the hard money faction the issue had denitely not been settled yet. More
than $346 million wartime greenbacks and an annually increasing amount of silver
certicates still threatened the gold standard. The reserve of around $100 million
gold dollars could only maintain the gold standard as long as the country remained
prosperous and the important task of the subsequent government was to secure the
gold standard. However, Calomiris (1992) demonstrates that fear about in
ation
remained by reporting expected in
ation rates to be higher than real in
ation rates.
In a similar vein, Studenski and Krooss (2003) perceives the risk that silver could be




For about two weeks after the suspension of the gold standard there was no ocial
market for gold in New York. People willing to buy or sell gold needed to appeal to
foreign coin dealers until this business became too voluminous to be conducted in
such an unorganized way. The rst organized gold trading started at the New York
Stock Exchange on January 13, 1862. A competing trading place was established in
a `dingy cellar' in William Street dubbed the `coal hole' (see Mitchell, 1903). As the
business became larger the market moved rst into the Gilpin's News Room, later
into the old stock board at No. 24 Beaver Street, and nally into New Street next to
the Stock Exchange. The traders in this market started referring to it as the `Gold
Room' and were content with the loose organization. It was not before October
1864 that a constitution and by-laws were adopted and regular ocers elected. It
is noteworthy that trading gold for other than commercial reasons at the New York
Stock Exchange was considered unpatriotic or a bet against the Union's victory.
This appeared in contrast to the Gold Room where speculations were not shunned
at (see Nugent, 1968).
The transaction volumes in these and in two other markets were reported to be
large. Importers and exporters had to change paper currency and gold to buy and
sell goods, but also tried to protect themselves against 
uctuations of the currency's
value while awaiting the execution of their contracts. In fact, Mitchell (1903, pp.
182-185) believed that the volume of speculation exceeded normal transactions by
far. However, speculators were not cherished by everyone as claried by Willard,
Guinnane, and Rosen (1996) quoting Abraham Lincoln's dictum on gold market
traders: `I wish every one of them had his devilish head shot o!'
Since the prices from the New York gold markets were telegraphed to all other
7important U.S. cities and regarded as authoritative, we neglect prices from other
cities. First sources of our data are nancial columns of daily papers like the Hunt's
Merchant Magazine, the Bankers' Magazine or the Commercial and Financial Chron-
icle. Typically, these sources report daily highest, lowest, and closing prices. There
are similar tables from the Chamber of Commerce of the State New York as well as
yearly published almanacs by other newspapers. However, the main source were the
detailed reports by J.C. Mersereau, Register of the Gold Exchange, who published
an annual book called `American Gold, 1862-(date of issue)'. This book gave the
quotations from 10 a.m. until 3 p.m. for every quarter of an hour.
All sources combined did not deviate by much and Mitchell (1908) checked them
for typos. He collated the data based on Mersereau's latest issue from 1878 with
the tables from the Commercial and Financial Chronicle from which he took the
data for the last year 1878. Finally, the rst two weeks were taken from New York's
daily papers so that the complete data set contains 5,170 daily observations of the
greenback/gold dollar exchange rate for the whole period from 1862 until 1879.
The exchange rates are given in indirect quotation meaning that $100 greenback
were exchanged for a given sum of gold dollars. For example, on January 2, 1863 $100
greenback were exchanged on average for $74.77 in gold. Mitchell (1908) compiled
all his data in the book `Gold, prices, and wages under the greenback standard'.1
Figure 1 about here
3.2 Data Description
Figure 1 displays the golddollar/greenback exchange rate between 1862 and 1879.
In mid-1864 the exchange rate dropped to only 37% of its face value and steadily
recovered afterwards. The rst vertical marking represents the end of the Civil
War around April 9, 1865 while the second marking shows the enactment of the
1The data can be accessed online at http://EH.net/databases/greenback.
8Resumption Act on January 14, 1875.2
Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 displays the evolution of the golddollar/greenback exchange rate dur-
ing the years 1874 to 1879. The reason for considering this shortened time interval
is that we aim at locating the switch to a regime of low volatility around the an-
nouncement date January 14, 1875. Shortly after Grant's Veto the greenback's
value appreciated, but then again fell steadily for several months (see the rst verti-
cal marking). Overall, this period was characterized by high uncertainty about the
upcoming nancial policy and possibly nancial market participants were initially
relieved that the Resumption Act was considered to be an in
ationist measure in
the short run. The second vertical line marks the day of the Resumption Act on
which the greenback price fell. The price went on falling and remained low for more
than six months before it suddenly peaked in September 1875. The exchange-rate
dynamics directly following the Resumption Act may be interpreted as evidence
that in the beginning the resumption did not aect nancial markets substantially.
The third vertical marking represents Hayes's victory of the presidential elections.
From then on the exchange rate appears to be trending upwards. Although Unger
(1964) reports that the nancial question had not been of major public concern
during the elections, we interpret this exchange-rate dynamics as evidence that
Hayes' hard money reputation actually aected the time series.
In spite of their political relevance the last three events represented by vertical
markings did not aect exchange-rate dynamics considerably. The failure of repeal
in 1877 had the potential to be the decisive hit against sound money opposition
and it appears that the appreciation was only delayed by this decision in favor of
the resumption. The steps taken later in 1878 had no substantial eect on the
2There still is controversy on the exact day dating the end of the Civil War. For an overview
treating the signicant events of the Civil War see Rhodes (1999).
9legal commitment of resumption so that the greenback steadily continued to trend
upwards towards par.
Figure 3 about here
Figure 3 displays the daily exchange-rate returns dened as 100[ln(xt) ln(xt 1)]
for the time between June 1, 1874 and December 31, 1879 amounting to a total of
1394 observations. Mere visual inspection of the return series reveals a regime of
declining exchange-rate volatility beginning in spring 1878 with the returns falling
to an extremely low level several months before the resumption. The mean of the
exchange-rate returns appears to 
uctuate randomly around zero.
In a rst preliminary statistical analysis we split the whole sample into two
equally large portions and compared the means and the standard deviations of both
subsamples. While the two subsample means only dier slightly from each other,
the standard deviations of both subsamples are given by ^ 1 = 0:21 and ^ 2=0.15 and
appear to be signicantly dierent from each other. This dierence in the standard
deviations becomes even larger if we modify both subsamples by considering the
rst subsample ranging from June 1874 until April 1878 and the second subsample
ranging from May 1878 until December 1878. In this case both standard deviations
are given by ^ 1 = 0:20 and ^ 2 = 0:067 hinting at a low volatility regime at the end
of the sample, a nding that is consistent with our conjecture described above.
4 Econometric Technique
4.1 Motivating Switching Volatility Regimes in the Dynam-
ics of the Golddollar/Greenback Exchange-Rate
In this section we provide an explanation for why we expect to nd distinct volatility
regimes in the nominal golddollar/greenback exchange-rate data described above.
Our explanation rests on the fact that the return to the gold standard marked
a transition between two alternative exchange-rate systems. Before the return to
10gold the exchange rate 
oated freely re
ecting changes in the relative supply-to-
demand conditions of the currencies involved while the return to gold represented
the introduction of a system of completely xed rates. Bearing this transition in
mind we invoke the existing literature on exchange-rate dynamics under alternative
exchange-rate systems and under consecutive international monetary regimes which
provides a theory-based motivation for switching volatility regimes in our time-series
data.
Several authors have analyzed a transition from a system of 
oating exchange
rates into a xed-rate system on a given future date and at publicly announced
xing-parity. Under rational expectations, the mere knowledge in the market that
the presently 
oating exchange rate will be irreversibly xed in the future does aect
the exchange-rate dynamics prior to the xing. Theoretical models of exchange-
rate dynamics under such a scenario have been developed by Miller and Sutherland
(1994), Sutherland (1995), DeGrauwe et al. (1999) and Wil
ing and Maennig (2001).
Although focusing on dierent aspects, all papers derive the same unambiguous
result: at that moment when the authorities publicly announce the future exchange-
rate xing the spot rate jumps from its 
oating-path onto an interim-path which
assures an arbitrage-free transition into the xed-rate system.
The analytical form of the interim-path crucially hinges on the political and in-
stitutional framework during the run-up to the xed-rate system. However, Wil
ing
and Maennig (2001) analyze a setting in which foreign exchange market participants
may be uncertain about the authorities' adherence to the publicly announced xing
date, that is, in which agents take account of the fact that the beginning of the
xed-rate system may be delayed. Two results concerning (conditional) exchange-
rate volatility along the interim-path are apparent from their model. (1) The mere
announcement of future exchange-rate xing reduces exchange-rate volatility along
the interim path. This volatility reduction is certain, even in a setting with market
uncertainty about the punctual entrance into the xed-rate system. Only in the ab-
11solutely extreme case in which agents believe that the xed-rate system will never
be implemented, exchange-rate volatility remains unaected by the announcement.
(2) The volatility reduction along the interim-path is maximal when agents assess
the political announcement as fully credible, that is, if they are convinced that the
exchange-rate xing will occur punctually at the previously specied future date.
Overall, an essential feature of the Wil
ing and Maennig (2001) model is that
there are two extreme volatility regimes during the run-up to the xed-rate system:
(1) an extreme high-volatility regime, during which agents are either not aware of
the future exchange-rate xing or believe that the xed-rate system will never be
implemented, and (2), an extreme low-volatility regime during which agents are
absolutely convinced that the exchange-rate xing will start according to schedule.
Apart from the economically well-grounded statements on the distinct volatility
regimes, the Wil
ing and Maennig (2001) model rests on an assumption that may
appear unrealistic at rst glance. Their model assumes that there is a clear-cut
date (the so-called announcement date) at which the future exchange-rate xing is
announced and that this announcement comes as a surprise to market participants.
In reality, however, inspired by political debates and perceptible institutional pro-
cesses, agents frequently form expectations about the punctual xing long before
any denite ocial announcement.
A straightforward way to overcome this inconsistency is to reinterpret the an-
nouncement date from the theoretical model as the date-of-rst-notice, that is, as
the date at which market participants perceive a potential future exchange-rate x-
ing for the rst time. Starting from this date, agents deem a shift from presently

oating to xed exchange rates possible and continuously assess the likelihood that
the xing will occur punctually at the given date. This phase of uncertainty revisions
will typically last for a while until market participants are absolutely convinced that
the exchange-rate xing will happen according to schedule. In what follows, the ear-
liest moment from which onwards agents are absolutely convinced of the punctual
12exchange-rate xing will be termed the date-of-full-acceptance.
Figure 4 about here
Figure 4 displays the schematic representation of the exchange-rate volatility
dynamics prior to the return to the gold standard as predicted by the theoretical
Wil
ing and Maennig (2001) model. Before the date-of-rst-notice agents believe
that the currently existing system of freely 
oating exchange rates will hold forever
so that exchange-rate volatility is high (extreme high-volatility regime). Next, we
consider the time between the date-of-full-acceptance and the return to gold. Dur-
ing this period, all uncertainty about the punctual xing will have been completely
resolved so that exchange-rate volatility should be low and, according to the theo-
retical model, should converge to zero shortly before the implementation of the gold
standard (extreme low-volatility regime). Finally, we consider the time between
the date-of-rst-notice and the date-of-full acceptance during which agents begin to
incorporate the potential future exchange rate xing into their currency valuation
schemes, but|owing to relevant news|more or less frequently modify their assess-
ments about the punctual return to the gold standard. Depending on the changes
in these assessments, this period is typically characterized by news-induced switches
between high and low exchange-rate volatility regimes. Wil
ing and Maennig (2001)
derive analytical formulas for the conditional exchange-rate volatility during this pe-
riod of uncertainty. They also prove that exchange-rate volatility during this period
strictly lies between the volatility levels from the above-described high- and the
low-volatility regimes what justies the notion `intermediate exchange-rate volatil-
ity' used in Figure 4.
Finally, it should be noted that the date-of-rst-notice and the date-of-full-
acceptance are both free to vary along the time axis in Figure 4 so that this frame-
work covers a broad range of possible scenarios. For example, both dates will co-
incide if market participants perceive a prospective return to the gold standard for
13the rst time and are immediately convinced that the exchange-rate xing will start
as ocially scheduled. An alternative scenario involves a considerable extent of un-
certainty about the return to gold that may remain until the actual institutional
implementation of the gold standard. In this case, the date-of-full-acceptance would
coincide with the return to gold.
However, although theoretically possible, it is not very likely that the market
uncertainty characterizing the period between the date-of-rst-notice and the date-
of-full-acceptance lasts for a very long time in real-world situations. Moreover, since
the corresponding volatility levels necessarily range between the volatility levels of
the extreme regimes, we waive modeling such intermediate regimes and focus on
the detection of the two extreme volatility regimes in our subsequent econometric
analysis.
4.2 A Markov-Switching GARCH Model
In order to model the two distinct volatility regimes in our exchange-rate return
series fRtg which we dene as
Rt = 100  [ln(Xt)   ln(Xt 1)]; (1)
we make use of a Markov-switching-GARCH model as developed in Gray (1996b)
and recently rened in Wil
ing (2009) and Gelman and Wil
ing (2009). The general
idea behind this econometric framework is that the data-generating process (DGP)
of the return Rt is aected by a latent random variable which represents the state
the DGP is in on any particular date t. In our analysis we denote this latent state
variable by St and use it to discriminate between the two distinct volatility regimes.
We specify St = 1 to indicate that the DGP is in the high-volatility regime whereas
St = 2 is meant to indicate that the DGP is in the low-volatility regime.
The basic element of our Markov-switching-GARCH model is the well-known
probability density function of a mean-shifted t-distribution with  degrees of free-
14dom, mean  and variance h, t;;h. Based on this parametric density function, our
next step will consist in specifying stochastic processes for the mean and the volatil-
ity in regime i, denoted by it and hit, according to which the exchange-rate return
Rt is generated conditional upon the regime indicator St = i;i = 1;2. After having
specied it and hit we can then represent the conditional distribution of the return
as a mixture of two mean-shifted t-distributions:
Rtjt 1 
(
t1;1t;h1t with probability p1t
t2;2t;h2t with probability (1   p1t)
; (2)
where t 1 denes the information set as of date t   1 and p1t  PrfSt = 1jt 1g
denotes the so-called ex-ante probability of being in regime 1 at time t.
In modeling our regime-dependent mean equation, we consider a simple form by
assuming a rst-order autoregressive process (AR(1)-process) in each regime yielding
it = a0i + a1i  Rt 1 for i = 1;2: (3)
In contrast to the mean equation (3), the specication of an adequate GARCH
process for the regime-specic variance hit is more problematic. Without going into
technical detail, we rst consider an aggregate of conditional return variances from





















  [p1t1t + (1   p1t)2t]
2 : (4)
The quantity ht now provides the basis for the specication of the regime-specic
conditional variances hit+1;i = 1;2 in the form of a parsimonious GARCH(1,1)-
structure. More explicitly, we follow the suggestion in Dueker (1997) and rst pa-
rameterize the degrees of freedom of the t;;h-distribution by q = 1=, so that
3See Gray (1996b) for a rigorous formal discussion.
15(1   2q) = (   2)=, and then specify our regime-specic GARCH equation as
hit = b0i + b1i(1   2qi)
2
t 1 + b2iht 1 (5)
with ht 1 as being given according to Eq. (4) and t 1 being obtained from
t 1 = Rt 1   E [Rt 1jt 2]
= Rt 1   [p1t 11t 1 + (1   p1t 1)2t 1]: (6)
It is important to note here that for i = 1;2 the sums b1i(1   2qi) + b2i of
the coecients from Eq. (5) constitute convenient measures of the regime-specic
persistence of volatility shocks. The higher the value of this measure the more time
it takes until a shock dies out. A regime-specic volatility shock will die out in
nite time if the coecient sum is less than 1. For the case of the coecient sum
being equal to 1 (i.e. for an integrated GARCH(1,1) process) volatility shocks have
a permanent eect and the unconditional variance of the process becomes innitely
large.
Finally, we close our Markov-switching-GARCH model by parameterizing the
regime indicator St as a rst-order Markov process with constant transition prob-
abilities. Denoting by i the probability of the DGP persisting in regime i (for
i = 1;2) between the dates t   1 and t, we specify
PrfSt = 1jSt 1 = 1g = 1; PrfSt = 2jSt 1 = 1g = 1   1;
PrfSt = 2jSt 1 = 2g = 2; PrfSt = 1jSt 1 = 2g = 1   2:
(7)
Now, the log-likelihood function of our Markov-switching-GARCH(1,1) model
can be obtained by performing similar calculations as in Gray (1996b). The exact
form of the function is presented in Wil
ing (2009). The log-likelihood function
contains the ex-ante probabilities p1t  PrfSt = 1jt 1g which can be estimated
via a recursive scheme. These probabilities are useful in forecasting one-step-ahead
regimes based on an information set that evolves over time. In our context, the
16ex-ante probabilities p1t re
ect current market perceptions of the one-step-ahead
volatility regime, thus representing an adequate measure of foreign exchange market
volatility sentiments. Besides the ex-ante probabilities p1t we also address the so-
called smoothed probabilities PrfSt = 1jTg which can be computed by the use of
lter techniques after the model estimation has been carried out.4 The smoothed
probabilities are based on the full sample-information set T and provide a tool for
inferring ex post if and when volatility regime switches have occurred in the sample.
Table 1 about here
5 Estimation Results
Table 1 presents the maximum-likelihood estimates of our Markov-switching GARCH
model. Maximization of the log-likelihood function was performed by the `MAXI-
MIZE'-routine within the software package RATS 6.1 using the BFGS-algorithm,
heteroscedasticity-consistent estimates of standard errors and suitably chosen start-
ing values for all parameters involved. In contrast to our theoretical mean equation
(3) we estimated an AR(1)-process with identical, non-switching parameters across
both regimes. We imposed the simplifying restriction a01 = a02 and a11 = a12 for two
reasons, namely (1) in order to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated,
and (2) to focus on the volatility features of the exchange-rate returns. Overall, we
nd that 9 out 12 parameters from our mean and GARCH equations (3) and (5)
are statistically signicant at the 1% level.5
The GARCH parameters of regime 1, b01;b11;b21 appear much larger than their
4In this paper, we have computed all smoothed probabilities with a lter algorithm provided by
Gray (1996a).
5Some comments on the probability distribution of the conventional t-statistic within our
Markov-switching-GARCH framework are in order. It has to be noted that the exact nite-
sample distribution of our t-statistics is generally unknown. However, owing to some well-known
asymptotic properties of general maximum-likelihood estimators in conjunction with an appro-
priate limiting-distribution result, it can be concluded that under the null hypothesis of a single
parameter being equal to zero, our t-statistics should converge in distribution towards a standard
normal variate. This implies asymptotic critical values of 2.58, 1.96 and 1.64 for the absolute value
of the t-statistic at the 1, 5, and 10%-levels, respectively.
17corresponding counterparts b02;b12;b22 in regime 2. In conjunction with the (modi-
ed) degree-of-freedom parameters q1 and q2 the regime-specic volatility persistence
measures b1i(1   2qi) + b2i are given by 0.6615 in regime 1 and 8:3  10 6 in regime
2 indicating a substantially higher degree of volatility persistence in regime 1 than
in regime 2. However, both volatility persistence measures are less than 1 which
suggests stationary conditional volatility processes in both regimes implying that
regime-specic volatility shocks die out in nite time. The estimates of the transi-
tion probabilities are given by ^ 1 = 0:9776 and ^ 2 = 0:8096 indicating a particularly
high degree of regime persistence for regime 1.
Apart from parameter estimation we also performed several specication tests
and diagnostic checks of the model t. Inter alia, we tested for serial correlation of
the squared standardized residuals for the lags 1, 2, 3, and 5 with the well-known
Ljung-Box-Q-test nding that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be
rejected up to lag 5 at any conventional signicance level. This result provides some
evidence in favor of our two-regime Markov-switching GARCH specication.6
Figure 5 about here
Next, we address the ex-ante and the smoothed probabilities PrfSt = 1jtg and
PrfSt = 1jTg both of which are relevant to detecting how often and at which
dates the exchange-rate returns switched between the high-volatility and the low-
volatility regimes. Figure 5 displays these regime-1 probabilities (in the upper pan-
els) along with the conditional variance process (in the lower panel) estimated from
our Markov-switching GARCH model.
Theoretically, we would expect to observe dynamics of the regime-1 probabilities
(more concretely of both the ex-ante as well as the smoothed regime-1 probabil-
ities) in line with the schematic representation depicted in Figure 4. Before the
date-of-rst notice exchange-rate volatility is high and, consequently, the regime-1
6Technical details of our specication and autocorrelation tests are available upon request.
18probabilities should be close to 1. Between the date-of-rst notice and the date-
of-full acceptance exchange-rate volatility should attain an intermediate level with
regime-1 probabilities 
uctuating between 1 and 0 while exchange-rate volatility
should be low after the date-of-full acceptance until the actual return to the gold
standard with regime-1 probabilities being close to 0.
In line with these theoretical considerations the vast majority of the regime-1
probabilities depicted in Figure 5 are indeed close to 1 at the beginning of the sam-
pling period. During this period the DGP is in the high-volatility regime as indicated
by the conditional variances shown in the lower panel of Figure 5. Between January
1876 and January 1878 the regime-1 probabilities exhibit more frequent downturns
towards zero indicating the interim period between the two alternative exchange-rate
systems during which market participants became increasingly convinced of the fu-
ture switch in exchange-rate regime. Finally, in May 1878 the regime-1 probabilities
start a sustained decline from one towards zero for the rest of the sampling pe-
riod re
ecting the switch to the low-volatility regime as suggested by the schematic
representation from Figure 4.
Interestingly, we can explain some of the downturns in the regime-1 probabili-
ties by decisive historical events. We observe, for example, an increasing number
of downturns during the year 1877 which we explain as being triggered by Hayes'
victory in the presidential elections in November 1876 since Hayes was well-known
for his sound money attitude what might have strengthened nancial market partic-
ipants' beliefs in the Resumption Act. However, it was not until May 1878 that the
regime-1 probabilities exhibit a more persistent decline towards zero indicating the
entrance into the low-volatility regime. While before that date the Bland-Allison
Act of January 1878 might have kept the DGP in the high-volatility regime 1 (al-
though its impact on the credibility of the resumption appears questionable) we
attribute the sustained switch to the low-volatility regime 2 in May 1878 to the
Silver Act which did not aect the legal commitment to resume on January 1, 1879.
19Furthermore, we interpret the persistent change in the regime-1 probabilities after
May 1878 as a substantial change in nancial market participants' expectations.
This interpretation is compatible with anecdotal evidence reporting that Sherman's
eorts to accumulate sucient gold reserves for resumption were considered credible.
A closer look at the conditional variances depicted in the lower panel of Figure
5 reveals that the variances stay below the value 0.025 most of the time and even
below 0.01 on 794 sampling days. It is presumably this narrow range of volatility
levels which makes it dicult to distinguish sharply between high- and low-volatility
regimes so that our regime-1 probabilities do not appear as clear-cut as suggested
by our theoretical reasoning. However, we sum up by emphasizing that our Markov-
switching GARCH framework is capable of locating a date after which market par-
ticipants appeared to be convinced of the resumption. We identify this date as June
1878 after which the DGP of our Markov-switching GARCH model remains in the
low-volatility regime most of the time. By contrast, we do not nd that clear-cut
empirical evidence around the start of the resumption process for which our model
appears to switch erratically between the volatility regimes. We interpret this result
as evidence for a high degree of uncertainty in U.S. nancial markets after the Civil
War.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze volatility changes in daily greenback-gold conversion rates
after the U.S. Civil War with the objective of characterizing the greenback's even-
tual return to convertibility in 1879. To this end we allow the greenback returns to
endogenously switch between high- and low-volatility regimes and model this sce-
nario within a Markov-switching GARCH framework. Our methodology is able to
locate the shift to low exchange-rate volatility and thus identies the time when mar-
ket participants assessed the implementation of the announced xed exchange-rate
regime fully credible.
20Our contribution to America's historiography consists in the nding that the
switch to convertibility announced for January 1, 1879 became credible half a year
earlier in summer 1878. In the light of the intense political struggle between in
a-
tionists and bullionists after the Civil War this result is quite surprising. Regarding
only qualitative evidence from historical sources, one might be inclined to conjecture
that the question of convertibility had not been settled before its ultimate imple-
mentation on January 1, 1879. However, despite all controversial discussions, our
volatility analysis provides strong quantitative evidence that political leaders could
credibly commit to their policy announcement.
Apart from its historical focus our volatility analysis also contributes to the
general debate about the economic factors that drive the exchange rate. Signi-
cant volatility regime-switching, as observed in this study, is likely to be caused
by changing expectations rather than by changing fundamentals. Consequently, we
interpret our empirical ndings as endorsing evidence emphasizing the substantial
role of nancial market expectations in exchange-rate determination.
The transition from a system of 
oating exchange rates to a xed-rate system is
a topic of major concern to economic historians.7 However, the bulk of this litera-
ture focuses on theoretical models capturing specic features of the exchange-rate
dynamics during this transitional period (see, inter alia, Flood and Garber, 1983;
Froot and Obstfeld, 1991). Besides a very few exceptions scattered in the liter-
ature (e.g. Smith and Smith, 1990) our study is one of a few analyzing the return
to a xed exchange-rate regime empirically. We believe that apart from its applica-
tion to the greenback resumption, our approach to analyzing switching structures in
exchange-rate volatility may be successfully applied to other comparable historical
episodes.
7See for example Miller and Sutherland (1994) concerning the debate about sterling's return to
gold after World War I.
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Figure 4: Schematic representation of exchange-rate volatility dynamics according
to the Wil
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Figure 5: Ex-ante regime-1 probabilities, smoothed regime-1 probabilities and con-
ditional variances of exchange-rate returnsTable 1
Estimation results for the Markov-switching-GARCH model
Estimate Std. error
Mean equation:
(identical in both regimes)
a01 = a02 0.0000 0.0000
a11 = a12  0.0021*** 2.29  10 11
Regime 1:
b01 0.0023*** 1.85  10 11
b11 0.5992*** 4.98  10 10
b21 0.3001*** 8.57  10 10
q1 = 1=1 0.1984*** 7.70  10 10
[^ b11  (1   2^ q1) +^ b21] [0.6615]
Regime 2:
b02 0.0000 0.0000
b12 0.0081*** 7.83  10 6
b22 0.0000 0.0000
q2 = 1=2 0.4996*** 3.96  10 11
[^ b12  (1   2^ q2) +^ b22] [8.30  10 6]
Transition probabilities:
1 0.9776*** 1.22  10 6
2 0.8096*** 1.13  10 9
Note: Estimates for parameters from the Eqs. (2) to (7). ***, ** and * denote statistical signicance
at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels, respectively.